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Abstract: Economists long considered money illusion to be largely 
irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful 
effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms, 
choices converge to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium; however, if we lift 
the veil of money by representing payoffs in real terms, the Pareto efficient 
equilibrium is selected. We also show that strategic uncertainty about the 
other players’ behavior is key for the equilibrium selection effects of 
money illusion: even though money illusion vanishes over time if subjects 
are given learning opportunities in the context of an individual optimization 
problem, powerful and persistent effects of money illusion are found when 
strategic uncertainty prevails.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The rational expectations revolution in the 1970's eradicated the study of money illusion, and 
its implications, from economists’ research agenda for a long time. The rational expectations 
approach assumes that people are rational; and since rational individuals do not exhibit 
illusions there is nothing to study. Money illusion was a concept to be mentioned in courses 
about the history of economic thought but not in actual research endeavors (Howitt 1989). In 
fact, a good recipe to get theory papers rejected by leading journals was to assume that money 
illusion affected individuals' behavior (Tobin 1972).1 More recently, however, some 
economists seem to be willing to reconsider the relevance of money illusion in economics, 
partly because of evidence that nominal wages and prices seem to be rigid (Akerlof 2002; 
Bewley 1999; Blinder et al. 1998; Campbell and Kamlani 1997; Fehr and Tyran 2001; Howitt 
2002; Kahn 1997; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986; Shafir, Diamond and Tversky 1997).  
A powerful intuitive argument supports the view that money illusion is largely 
irrelevant for economics, however: the illusion has detrimental effects on peoples' economic 
well-being and they thus have a strong incentive to make illusion free decisions. Therefore, 
people will ultimately make illusion free decisions, implying that money illusion has little or 
no impact on aggregate outcomes – at least in the long run. It is the purpose of this paper to 
show that this argument can be seriously misleading because it neglects the strategic 
repercussions of money illusion. We show experimentally that even if learning in the context 
of an individual optimization problem does remove individuals’ money illusion, there can be 
large permanent effects of money illusion in a strategic environment. These effects arise 
because money illusion induces individuals to coordinate on inferior equilibria. Once 
individuals are locked in a bad equilibrium there is no escape, meaning that they experience 
permanent economic losses relative to the efficient equilibrium. Thus, even if individual-level 
money illusion is only a temporary phenomenon in an individual optimization task, it can 
cause permanent real effects in a strategic setting by coordinating people on inefficient 
equilibria.  
                                                 
1  James Tobin (1972, p. 3) nicely described this situation: “An economic theorist can, of course, commit no 
greater crime than to assume money illusion”. Tobin himself believed that money illusion is relevant.  
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Our results are based on a series of experiments that implemented a strategic pricing 
game with 3 Pareto-ranked equilibria. The experimental design is based on the 
characterization of money illusion as a framing effect (Shafir, Diamond and Tversky 1997, 
Fehr and Tyran 2001). Money illusion occurs when objectively identical situations cause 
different behavioral patterns depending on whether the situation is framed in nominal or in 
real terms. Accordingly, we capture the impact of money illusion by comparing behavior in a 
condition in which payoff information is provided in real terms to behavior in a condition in 
which payoff information is provided in nominal terms. In the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, 
each subject earns the highest real payoff but the nominal payoff is highest for each subject in 
a different equilibrium. Thus, if we give subjects payoff information in nominal terms they 
may exhibit money illusion by taking nominal payoffs as a proxy for real payoffs and 
coordinate on the equilibrium with highest nominal payoffs. In contrast, if we give subjects 
payoff information in real terms, the situation is transparent and it is clear that they earn the 
most in the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. This means that money illusion is ruled out under 
the real payoff representation while money illusion can play a role under the nominal payoff 
representation by coordinating subjects on a Pareto-inferior equilibrium. Therefore, if money 
illusion has no or little relevance, subjects should play the Pareto-dominant equilibrium both 
under the nominal and the real representation of payoffs.  
The actual behavior of experimental subjects contrasts sharply with this prediction. 
Most subjects under the real payoff representation start to play at or close to the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium and nearly all subjects quickly converge to this equilibrium. Not a 
single subject under the nominal payoff representation, however, plays this equilibrium. In 
this condition, the vast majority of subjects start to play far away from the Pareto-dominant 
equilibrium and they then converge to the inefficient equilibrium with high nominal payoffs. 
As a consequence, subjects’ real earnings under the nominal payoff representation are on 
average almost 50 percent lower than under the real payoff representation. These results 
illustrate that money illusion may be a powerful source of coordination failure, causing 
permanent real effects.  
In a next step, we examined the extent to which individual-level money illusion causes 
the failure to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. This question is interesting because 
coordination failure in a strategic setting may also arise from the belief that the other players 
have money illusion. If everyone believes that the other players have money illusion and that, 
therefore, the others coordinate on a Pareto-inferior equilibrium with high nominal payoffs, it 
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is in everyone's interest to play this equilibrium as well. To examine individual-level money 
illusion, we implemented a treatment in which each subject plays against pre-programmed 
computers who play a best reply. In addition, subjects are informed about the computers’ 
response to each of their feasible choices. This means that the equilibrium selection problem 
is transformed into an individual optimization problem. In a sense, subjects are no longer in a 
truly strategic situation because no strategic uncertainty exists with regard to the other 
players’ choices. Subjects can maximize their payoffs by unilaterally choosing the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium, taking the computers’ responses into account. If subjects can solve this 
optimization problem better under the real payoff representation than under the nominal 
payoff representation, we have evidence for individual-level money illusion.  
The data indicates that a considerable number of subjects indeed suffer from individual-
level money illusion during the first half of the experiment. Towards the end of the 
experiment, most subjects learn to make the optimal decision by choosing the efficient 
equilibrium. This observation shows that money illusion indeed vanishes at the individual 
level if subjects can repeatedly make the same decision in the context of an individual 
optimization task. However, repeatedly making the same decision in a strategic setting, where 
subjects face other human players whose actions have to be predicted, does not prevent the 
vast majority of subjects from coordinating on an inferior equilibrium. Apparently, it is one 
thing to pierce the veil of money in an individual optimization problem and another thing to 
escape the impact of money illusion in a strategic setting.  
A few other papers have examined the role of money illusion in recent years. Shafir, 
Tversky and Diamond (1997) provided interesting questionnaire evidence indicating that 
money illusion affects both people’s preferences as well as their perceptions of the constraints 
they face. More recently, Fehr and Tyran (2001) have shown that money illusion causes 
asymmetric responses to anticipated negative and positive monetary shocks. Money illusion 
strongly retards the adjustment of nominal prices to a unique equilibrium after a negative 
monetary shock, while prices quickly adjust to the new unique equilibrium after a positive 
shock. However, none of the previous papers has considered the effects of money illusion on 
coordination failure, i.e., they did not examine whether money illusion has permanent effects 
on subjects’ behavior. In addition, we go beyond previous work by showing that, although 
there is a substantial initial prevailing level of money illusion, this illusion indeed vanishes if 
the decision about equilibrium selection is reduced to a repeated individual optimization 
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problem. However, as our results on coordination failure show, this fact is fully compatible 
with powerful and persistent effects of money illusion in a strategic setting.  
An important implication of the presence of money illusion is that nominal frames can 
have important real effects by coordinating the behavior of economic agents. Our experiment 
demonstrates this by examining behavior under a real and a nominal frame. The introduction 
of the Euro, for example, provided a natural experiment in which the nominal frame was 
changed. In the absence of money illusion, this change should not have affected people’s 
behavior. Recent evidence seems to indicate, however, that the Euro changeover led to 
significant price changes in specific markets. For example, in January 2002, "the month-on-
month increase in prices charged by restaurants and cafés in the euro area ... was more than 
three times higher than the average increase in the same month during the period 1996-2001... 
Similar price movements were noted for hairdressing … and other service items. For most of 
these items, price increases in the euro area were also rather high compared with those in non-
euro area EU countries." (ECB 2003: 40). Adriani et al. (2003) suggest that the Euro 
changeover acted as a coordination device by shifting the industry to a high-price equilibrium. 
Empirical evidence based on data from 746 restaurants in the Michelin Red Guide 2002 and 
2003 for six countries (Denmark, Sweden, UK, France, Germany, Italy) supports this 
conclusion. The increase was considerably higher in those countries which adopted the euro 
(France, Germany, Italy) than in the Non-Euro countries (Denmark, Sweden, UK).2 This 
evidence is consistent with the view that purely nominal changes may have real effects 
because they lead to coordinated price changes.3  
We believe that our paper also contributes to the debate about equilibrium selection 
principles in games with multiple equilibria. This debate has a strong focus on the principles 
of payoff dominance and risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten 1988; van Huyck, Battalio and 
Beil 1991; Cooper et al. 1990, Cooper 1999, Camerer 2003). The principle of payoff 
dominance is typically interpreted as implying that equilibria, which dominate in terms of real 
payoffs, may have a particular attraction power. To our knowledge, no contributor in this 
debate has yet explicitly differentiated between nominal payoff dominance and real payoff 
dominance. The evidence presented in this paper shows, however, that this distinction is 
                                                 
2  In the three Euro countries, the most expensive restaurant items increased by 4.8%, the least expensive by 
4.5%; the numbers were 0% and 0.5%, respectively in the three Non-Euro countries.  
3  The Euro changeover is, of course, a very complex natural experiment that led to many other changes as well. 
For example, the Euro facilitates price comparisons across national borders, probably enhancing competition 
and constraining price increases. However, this effect is likely to be negligible for locally traded services.   
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crucial. High nominal payoffs, even though associated with low real payoffs, seem to attract a 
considerable number of subjects. This suggests that the principle of nominal payoff 
dominance should also be taken into account in future discussions about equilibrium 
selection. Equilibria with high nominal payoffs may be focal points with a strong attraction 
power. 
In the next section we describe the experimental design in more detail. Section 3 reports 
the results of our experiments. Section 4 summarizes our results and concludes the paper.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
To study the effects of money illusion on equilibrium selection, we designed a symmetric n-
player pricing game with three Pareto-ranked equilibria. In this game, each subject 
simultaneously chose a price Pi ∈  {1, 2, …, 30}. We implemented a symmetric game because 
we thought that this would simplify the attainment of an equilibrium. In addition, we also 
chose a simple payoff structure where each subjects’ real payoff depended only on the 
subject’s own price and on the average price iP−−  of the other n-1 players. This was 
advantageous as it allowed us to represent each subject's payoff in a payoff matrix (see 
Appendix A). The payoff matrix showed the subject’s payoff for any combination of the own 
price Pi and the others’ average price iP−− . Since the game was symmetric, each of the n 
players in the group had the same payoff table, which was common knowledge among the 
players.  
The three equilibria of the game are described in Table 1 below. Equilibrium A arises 
when each subject chooses PA = 4, leading to a real payoff of πA = 28 for each player. In 
equilibrium B, the price is PB = 10 causing a real payoff of 5. Equilibrium C arises when each 
subject chooses PC = 27, leading to a real payoff πC = 21. The players’ best reply functions 
had a non-negative slope: if iP−−  increased it was, in general, also in the interest of player i to 
increase his price. For every given level of iP−−  player i had a unique best reply. Since the 
game is symmetric, the equilibria in this game in (Pi, iP−− ) space are located at the 
intersection of the best reply function with the 45-degree line. If subjects have adaptive 
expectations and play a best reply to their expectation, equilibrium A and C are stable, and 
equilibrium B is unstable.  
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Table 1: The equilibria in the price-setting game 
Equilibrium Equilibrium price 
level 
Real equilibrium 
payoff 
Nominal equilibrium 
payoff 
A PA = 4 πA = 28 PAπA = 112 
B PB = 10 πB = 5 PBπB = 50 
C PC = 27 πC = 21 PCπC = 567 
 
Our price-setting game was implemented in four different treatment conditions (see Table 2). 
The treatments differed only with regard to the presentation of the payoffs and whether 
subjects played against other subjects or against n-1 pre-programmed computers. Individuals’ 
real payoff functions were identical across treatments, i.e. the subjects earned the same real 
payoff for any combination of Pi and iP−− , regardless of the treatment condition. Subjects’ 
payoff matrix under the real payoff representation showed their payoff in real terms, while 
their payoff matrix showed their nominal payoff under the nominal payoff representation.4 To 
compute the real payoff under the nominal representation, subjects had to deflate their 
nominal payoff by the prevailing level of iP−− .5 This was explained to the subjects in detail in 
the experimental instructions (see appendix A).  
The behavioral differences across treatments with a nominal and a real payoff 
representation capture the effects of money illusion. Historically, economists have defined 
money illusion as a violation of the homogeneity postulate. According to this definition, 
money illusion prevails if demand and supply functions are not homogeneous of degree zero 
in all nominal prices (Leontief 1936). If all nominal prices change by the same percentage, 
people’s opportunity set remains constant, so that rational individuals will make the same 
                                                 
4  Appendix A presents the payoff matrix for the real and the nominal case. 
5  We chose the average price of the other n -1 players as the deflator to make the subjects’ task easier compared 
to the case where the overall average price of the group is the deflator. To be able to play a best reply, subjects 
have to predict iP−− . Therefore, they have to deflate their nominal payoff with the predicted value of iP−− to 
compute their expected real payoff.  
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decisions as before the price change. Therefore, the historical definition is based on the 
intuition that rational individuals will make identical choices in objectively identical 
situations (when the objective consumption opportunities remain constant), regardless of the 
fact that nominal prices have changed: The nominal representation of a situation does not 
affect the behavior of rational individuals; if it does, individuals suffer from money illusion. 
In terms of our treatment conditions, this means that money illusion is absent if there are no 
behavioral differences across the nominal and the real payoff representation. 
One main purpose of our pricing game was to create a conflict between two potentially 
important equilibrium selection principles – the principle of real payoff dominance and the 
principle of nominal payoff dominance. This conflict between nominal and real payoff 
dominance is illustrated in Table 1, where the real payoff is highest for every player in 
equilibrium A but the nominal payoff is highest in equilibrium C. In fact, the payoff vector in 
equilibrium A is the only Pareto efficient point in the payoff space which renders equilibrium 
A particularly attractive. The principle of real payoff dominance predicts that equilibrium A is 
selected regardless of whether payoffs are represented in nominal or in real terms because the 
principle assumes that subjects can pierce the veil of money under the nominal representation. 
In contrast, the principle of nominal payoff dominance predicts that equilibrium A is selected 
when payoffs are represented in real terms while equilibrium C is selected under the nominal 
payoff representation. If we indeed observe that players permanently coordinate on 
equilibrium A under the real representation and on equilibrium C under the nominal 
representation, we not only have evidence for the principle of nominal payoff dominance but 
also for the striking claim that money illusion may have permanent real effects.  
When the subjects faced pre-programmed computers, we told them the computers’ 
aggregate reply, i.e., the level of iP−−  the computers choose for each of their feasible price 
choices. Thus, each subject was a “Stackelberg-leader” vis à vis the n-1 computers. Each 
computer was programmed to play a best reply to the subject’s choice and to the other 
computers’ choices. Note that since subjects’ knew the computers’ response to each of their 
feasible price choices they faced no strategic uncertainty. To maximize their payoff, they had 
to solve an individual optimization problem taking the computers’ aggregate response into 
account. The treatments with computerized opponents therefore measure the extent to which 
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subjects can solve this individual optimization problem by choosing the efficient equilibrium 
A.  
 
Table 2: Experimental Design 
 Payoff representation in 
real terms 
Payoff representation in 
nominal terms 
Human opponents Real treatment with human 
opponents (RH): 13 groups 
with n human players 
Nominal treatment with 
human opponents (NH): 26 
groups with n human players 
Pre-programmed 
computerized opponents 
Real treatment with 
computerized opponents 
(RC): 23 groups with 1 
human and n-1 computerized 
players in each group 
Nominal treatment with 
computerized opponents 
(NC): 22 groups with 1 
human and n-1 computerized 
players in each group 
 
Table 1 demonstrates clearly that equilibrium A dominates the other two equilibria in real 
terms. However, subjects may not be able to play the best equilibrium immediately. They may 
have to discover the best equilibrium when facing human opponents, or their optimal strategy 
when facing computerized opponents. For this reason, we repeated the same game for 30 
periods in each treatment condition. When subjects faced human opponents, the group 
composition remained constant throughout the 30 periods. In all conditions, subjects were 
informed about the actual average price of the other players, iP−− , at the end of each period 
and about their own real payoff. Then they entered the next period where they again chose 
their prices simultaneously.  
The overall purpose of our treatment conditions was to isolate the role of money illusion 
as an equilibrium selection device from other boundedly rational forms of equilibrium 
selection. The two major conditions in our design are the Real treatment with human 
opponents (RH) and the Nominal treatment with human opponents (NH). The difference 
between these two conditions demonstrates the overall effect of money illusion on 
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equilibrium selection. Money illusion can play no role in the RH because by representing 
payoffs in real terms the veil of money is already lifted. Money illusion could cause 
behavioral effects in the NH if, for example, subjects take nominal payoffs as a proxy for real 
payoffs. Thus, if significantly more subjects play the efficient equilibrium in RH compared to 
NH, we have evidence that money illusion affects equilibrium selection.  
The next task then is to examine the mechanism that leads to the selection effects of 
money illusion. In principle, money illusion can effect equilibrium selection in two ways. 
First, there may be direct effects of money illusion on equilibrium selection: subjects may 
play the inefficient equilibrium C because they exhibit individual-level money illusion. 
Second, there may be indirect effects arising from subjects’ expectations about other players’ 
money illusion. Even if no player exhibits individual-level money illusion, most subjects may 
nevertheless have an incentive to play the inefficient equilibrium C if they believe that a 
sufficient number of other players exhibit money illusion and will, therefore, play equilibrium 
C. Our treatments with computerized opponents enable us to isolate the extent to which 
individual level money illusion directly affects equilibrium selection.  
In the RC, the real treatment with computerized opponents, we measure the extent to 
which individual-level irrationality other than money illusion affects equilibrium selection. In 
the RC, any deviation from the efficient equilibrium A denotes a non-optimal individual 
choice.6 In the NC, subjects face an individual optimization problem under the nominal 
payoff representation. The difference in subjects’ price choices between the RC and the NC 
treatment informs us to what extent individual-level money illusion contributes to mis-
coordination. If fewer subjects are able to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium in the NC 
than in the RC, we have evidence that individual-level money illusion is a source of mis-
coordination. 
Finally, our design allows for two other important comparisons: first, the comparison 
between the RC and the RH and, second, the comparison between the NC and the NH. The 
difference between RC and RH measures whether individual irrationality isolated from 
                                                 
6  When we designed the pricing game it was important to ensure that the same price choices constituted an 
equilibrium in the treatments with computerized opponents, where subjects were “Stackelberg-leaders” vis à 
vis the computers, as in the treatments with human opponents, where all players simultaneously chose their 
prices. Since the same price choices constitute equilibria across all four treatments, we can isolate the impact 
of individual irrationality from the other determinants of equilibrium selection.  
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money illusion is magnified or mitigated by strategic interaction with human players. If, for 
example, subjects play the efficient equilibrium more often in the RH than in the RC, we can 
conclude that strategic interaction with human players weakens the impact of individual 
irrationality other than money illusion on equilibrium selection.  
A particularly interesting result would be obtained if individual irrationalities other than 
money illusion played no or almost no role in RH. In this case, the total amount of mis-
coordination in the NH could be attributed to the direct and indirect effects of money illusion. 
Moreover, the difference between NC and NH in this case can be attributed to the indirect 
effects of money illusion arising solely through strategic interaction with human players.7  
The experiments were conducted with the software Z-tree (Fischbacher 1999). A total 
of 174 undergraduate students from the Universities of Zürich, St. Gallen, and Innsbruck 
participated in our sessions. On average, an experimental session lasted 45 minutes and 
subjects earned CHF 31.20 (≈ US $ 25). Subjects were randomly allocated to groups of n = 5 
or n = 6 players. They received written instructions explaining the procedures of the 
experiment, and nominal or real payoff matrices depending on the treatment condition (see 
Appendix A). The calculation of real payoffs based on the nominal payoffs shown on the 
payoff matrix was carefully explained in the NC and the NH. Subjects were allowed to ask 
questions before the experiment started. In each period they had to choose a price Pi ∈  {1, 2, 
…, 30}. In addition, they had to indicate their expectation of iP−−  in the treatments with 
human opponents in each period.  
 
3. Results 
In the following we compare the results of our treatment conditions. Our main interest is 
focused on the comparison between the NH and the RH. We summarize this comparison in  
                                                 
7  More generally, the indirect effects of money illusion can be measured by comparing the price difference 
between RH and RC with the price difference between NH and NC. The difference between NH and NC 
measures the indirect effects of all individual irrationalities because both money illusion and other individual 
irrationality can play a role in the nominal treatments. The difference between RH and RC measures only the 
indirect effects of individual irrationality that have nothing to do with money illusion. Thus, by subtracting the 
price difference between RH and RC, PRH – PRC, from the price difference between NH and NC, PNH – PNC, we 
isolate the indirect effects of money illusion on prices. Note, that if PRH – PRC ≤ 0, the indirect effects of 
money illusion are given by (PNH – PNC) – (PRH – PRC) which is greater than or equal to PNH – PNC. Therefore, 
the whole difference between PNH and PNC can be attributed to the indirect effects of money illusion.  
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Result 1:  In the Nominal treatment with human opponents (NH), the vast majority of the 
subjects converge to the inefficient equilibrium C, whereas almost all subjects 
quickly converge to the efficient equilibrium A in the Real treatment with human 
opponents (RH).  
 
Figure 1 and Tables 3 and 4 provide support for Result 1. Figure 1 and Table 3 show the 
evolution of average prices across NH and RH. The figure illustrates that a large gap in 
average prices across treatments already arises in period 1 – the average price in the NH is 
20.1 in the first period whereas it is 8.4 in the RH. This difference is highly significant (p < 
.0001) according to a Mann-Whitney test. Moreover, the average price quickly converges 
towards the efficient equilibrium PA = 4 in the RH whereas a steady convergence to the 
inefficient equilibrium PC = 27 occurs in the NH.8 From period 4 onwards, the average price 
in the RH is always extremely close to PA = 4 and the hypothesis that subjects play the 
efficient equilibrium can only be rejected (at the 10 percent significance level) in periods 1 
and 2.9  
Table 4 presents the percentage of subjects who play the efficient equilibrium. From 
this table it becomes transparent how radically different individuals’ price choices in the NH 
and the RH are. Throughout the 30 periods, there is not a single case in which a subject chose 
the efficient equilibrium in the NH, while 64 percent of the subjects already opted for PA = 4 
in period 1 in the RH. From period 7 onwards more than 90 percent of the subjects chose the 
efficient equilibrium in the RH. In contrast, a relatively slow convergence to the inefficient 
equilibrium PC = 27 occurs in the NH. Initially, only 18 percent of the subjects chose PC = 27 
but 38 percent already played this equilibrium in period 10, and reaching 68 percent in period 
20 and 84 percent in period 30.  
Naturally, this divergence between the NH and the RH is reflected in the real payoffs 
the subjects earned. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 show that subjects earn considerably less in 
                                                 
8  Period-wise Mann-Whitney tests with group average prices as the units of observation indicate significant 
differences (p < .001) between RH and NH in every period.  
9  This is indicated by period-wise t-tests with group average prices as the units of observation. From period 3 
onwards the p-values for the null hypothesis of equilibrium play exceed the 10 percent level.  
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the NH than in the RH in all periods. Recall from Table 1 that the real equilibrium payoff in 
the efficient equilibrium is 28, while if subjects play the inefficient equilibrium C they only 
earn 21. There is rarely a period in which subjects do not earn at least 10 units more on 
average in the RH. This indicates that the mis-coordination in the NH goes beyond the fact 
that subjects coordinated on an inefficient equilibrium. The large payoff difference is partly 
caused by the larger incidence of disequilibrium play in the NH.10  
The striking price divergence across the NH and the RH suggests that money illusion 
has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. The mere fact that payoffs are represented in 
nominal terms induces subjects to predominantly choose the equilibrium with the higher 
nominal but the lower real payoff. How can this fact be explained? The movement of price 
expectations across treatments provides a first hint (see the broken graphs in Figure 1). The 
average price path in both the RH and the NH closely parallels subjects’ average expectations 
of iP−− . Since subjects almost always played a best reply to their expectation about iP−−  this 
expectation is a decisive determinant of subjects’ price choices.11 Therefore, the strong 
divergence of the subjects' price expectations, which was already apparent in period 1, is of 
great interest – they expected on average a value of 20.0 for iP−−  in the NH, whereas they 
expected a value of 8.2 in the RH. Not a single subject (out of 77) expected iP−−  = 4 in period 
1 in the NH and only 1 subject expected iP−−  = 5. In contrast, 48.1 percent (25 out of 52) held 
equilibrium expectations of iP−−  = 4 in the RH and an additional 11.5 percent (6 out of 52) 
expected iP−−  = 5 in period 1. These differences in expectations are highly significant (Mann-
Whitney test, p < .0001).  
So far our analysis suggests that the nominal representation of payoffs causes 
significantly higher price expectations, which in turn induce subjects to choose significantly 
higher prices in the NH. This raises the question whether there were indeed subjects who 
failed to see through the veil of money or whether the higher expectations in the NH were 
                                                 
10 Subjects occasionally caused disequilibrium play by choosing low prices in a deliberate attempt to push the 
group towards the efficient equilibrium. 
11 If a subject is uncertain about the true value of iP−−  the calculation of the best reply requires, of course, taking 
the subjective distribution of iP−−  and not only the expectation of iP−−  into account. However, for simplicity, 
in the following we will use the term “best reply” in the sense of a best reply to the expectation of iP−− . 
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solely rooted in subjects’ beliefs about other players’ money illusion. To examine the 
existence of individual-level illusion we turn to  
 
Result 2:  Only a minority of subjects initially plays the efficient equilibrium in the Nominal 
treatment with computerized opponents (NC), whereas a large majority of 
subjects plays the efficient equilibrium from the beginning in the Real treatment 
with computerized opponents (RC). However, the differences between the NC and 
the RC become small and insignificant over time.  
 
We provide support for Result 2 by means of Figure 2 and Tables 3 to 5. In Figure 2, we 
depict the evolution of average prices in the RC and the NC. To facilitate comparison with the 
previously discussed treatments, we also included the average prices of the RH and the NH. 
Figure 2 and Table 3 show that the average price in the NC in the first 15 periods lies between 
4 and 12 units higher than in the RC. Yet, the price difference diminishes to only 2-3 units 
from period 16 onwards. A similar picture emerges if we look at the frequency with which the 
efficient equilibrium is played (see Table 4). Almost two thirds of all subjects already play the 
efficient equilibrium in period 1 of the RC and the frequency of equilibrium play from period 
10 onwards is rarely below 80 percent. In the NC, only 22.7 percent of the subjects play the 
efficient equilibrium in period 1 and it takes 16 periods until roughly two-thirds of the 
subjects play PA = 4. Finally, we also conducted period-wise Mann Whitney test of the null 
hypothesis that subjects’ price choices are identical across the RC and the NC. Table 5 
indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected for the majority of the first 15 periods. From 
period 16 onwards, the null hypothesis can no longer be rejected.  
Thus, taken together, the evidence suggests that the nominal representation causes 
significantly more problems for the subjects in solving the individual optimization problem. 
This provides direct evidence for individual-level money illusion. Yet, over time subjects 
increasingly learn to see better through the veil of money and solve the optimization problem 
in the NC roughly in the same way as in the RC. This result seems to provide a justification 
for economists’ reluctance to take money illusion seriously because if subjects have 
inexpensive individual learning opportunities, individual-level money illusion largely 
disappears over time. We believe, however, that this conclusion is premature because even if 
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individual-level money illusion only exists temporarily it may nevertheless contribute to the 
selection of inefficient equilibria or it may strongly retard adjustment towards a unique 
equilibrium as shown in Fehr and Tyran (2001). The reason why the conclusion mentioned 
above is premature is that strategic interaction with human players may magnify individual-
level irrationality. For this reason we next examine how strategic interaction in the RH affects 
individual irrationality other than money illusion:  
 
Result 3:  Strategic interaction with human players in the treatments with a real payoff 
representation increases the frequency with which the efficient equilibrium is 
played and, eventually, removes almost all inefficiencies.  
 
Figure 2 and Table 3 show that the average price in the RC and the RH in period 1 is almost 
identical. After period 1, the average price quickly converges to the efficient equilibrium in 
the RH while it fluctuates between 2 and 4 units above the efficient equilibrium in the RC. In 
Table 5, we have conducted period-wise Mann Whitney tests of the null hypothesis of equal 
average group prices across the RC and the RH. Occasionally, the difference is significant 
(e.g. in periods 2, 10, and 15) but the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in most periods. 
Nevertheless, the relative frequency with which the efficient equilibrium is played is higher in 
the RH than in the RC in most periods (see Table 4). In period 1, 65.2 percent of the 
individuals in the RC and 63.2 percent of subjects in the RH play the efficient equilibrium but 
from period 5 onwards the frequency of efficient equilibrium play is always higher in the RH, 
reaching 98 percent in the final 4 periods. Thus, although the difference between the RC and 
the RH is small, it persists over time. This indicates that there is a small amount of individual-
level irrationality in the RC, which is largely removed in the RH. Interestingly, when payoffs 
are represented in real terms strategic interactions with human players do not magnify but 
remove the impact of individual-level bounded rationality on mis-coordination. A possible 
interpretation of this result is that the imitation of other human players enhances adjustment 
towards the equilibrium in the RH. Recall that in the RH, most players quickly play the Pareto 
efficient equilibrium. This information is transmitted to the subjects at the end of each period, 
so that the less than fully rational subjects can easily imitate the others’ behavior. Such 
imitation is not possible in the RC where each subject has to calculate the response of the 
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computerized players to his or her own choice. An alternative interpretation is that rational 
play is easier in the RH than in the RC if the vast majority of human opponents plays the 
Pareto efficient equilibrium. In this case, strategic uncertainty about the others’ behavior is 
virtually absent and it is, therefore, easy for the less intelligent players to best reply to the 
“given” average price of the others. Since the average price of the other (computerized) 
players in the RC cannot be taken as given, no such easy solution exists for the less intelligent 
players. In view of the fact that strategic interaction in the RH facilitates full adjustment 
towards the efficient equilibrium relative to the RC, a comparison of people's behavior in the 
NC and the NH is of interest: 
 
Result 4:  Under the nominal payoff representation, strategic interaction with human players 
causes a large increase in the frequency with which the inefficient equilibrium C is 
played, and it completely eliminates play of the efficient equilibrium from the 
beginning.  
 
We again refer to Figure 2 and Tables 3 to 5 to support this result. Figure 2 and Table 3 
indicate that the average price in the NC and the NH are relatively close together in the first 
two to three periods. However, whereas the average price rises steadily in the NH, it falls in 
the NC, generating a sharply increasing price difference. This gradual divergence in average 
prices is reflected in period-wise Mann Whitney tests presented in Table 5. During the first 8 
periods, the null hypothesis of equal average group prices across NC and NH cannot be 
rejected but afterwards prices are always significantly different. The reason for the diverging 
price movements is that subjects learn to choose the efficient equilibrium in the NC whereas 
groups increasingly coordinate on the inefficient equilibrium in the NH. In the NC, the 
frequency of playing the efficient equilibrium rises from 22.7 percent in period 1 to 81.8 
percent in period 30, while the frequency of playing the inefficient equilibrium C in the NH 
rises from 18.2 percent in period 1 to 84.4 percent in period 30.  
In our view, the comparison between the NC and the NH is exciting because it suggests 
that most subjects do learn to play the efficient equilibrium when they are provided with 
individual learning opportunities and when they are not entrapped in the attraction power of 
an inefficient equilibrium. Thus, individual learning largely removes the power of the veil of 
 16
money over subjects’ behavior in an environment where beliefs about the opponents’ money 
illusion are rendered irrelevant. However, when subjects play the pricing game with other 
humans, the level of money illusion which existed initially throws subjects in the basin of 
attraction of the inefficient equilibrium from which no escape seems possible. The inefficient 
equilibrium slowly but relentlessly attracts the subjects’ behavior. This development is also 
associated with a shift in the relative importance of the direct and the indirect effects of 
money illusion. Initially, during the first few periods, the difference in prices between the NC 
and the NH is small, suggesting that individual-level money illusion initially dominates 
subjects’ behavior in both treatments. Over time, individual-level illusion declines in the NC 
but the overall effect of money illusion nevertheless increases as indicated by the rising 
frequency with which the inefficient equilibrium is played in the NH. This suggests that the 
indirect effects of money illusion, which are caused by the effects of money illusion on 
subjects’ price expectations, become increasingly important over time.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we show that seemingly innocuous differences in the payoff representation have 
powerful effects on equilibrium selection. When payoffs are represented in nominal terms, 84 
percent of the subjects eventually converge to a Pareto inferior equilibrium while 98 percent 
of the subjects finally play the Pareto efficient equilibrium under the real payoff 
representation. This constitutes clear and powerful evidence for the behavioral relevance of 
money illusion. In addition, our results suggest that nominal payoff dominance is an 
equilibrium selection principle which drives individuals’ behavior in strategic settings. We are 
also able to show that the persistent effects of money illusion occur, although most 
individuals are eventually able to pierce the veil of money when they are given individual 
learning opportunities. Thus, the argument that the impact of money illusion on aggregate 
outcomes will eventually vanish through learning, can be seriously misleading. In our context, 
it is misleading because learning in strategic environments with multiple equilibria may be 
difficult or impossible or, if it occurs, it may be too late to have much impact on the aggregate 
outcome. 
Finally, we believe that our experimental design can be the basis for further 
investigations. For example, by conducting the NC condition after the NH condition it would 
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be possible to study whether the NH condition prevents subjects from piercing the veil of 
money, i.e., from learning which is the best equilibrium in real payoff terms, or whether 
subjects are caught in a Pareto inferior equilibrium despite the fact that they know 
individually what the best equilibrium is. Suppose, for example that subjects, who first 
experienced the NH condition, exhibit the same pattern of behavior in the subsequent NC 
condition as subjects who play the NC condition from the beginning. This would constitute 
evidence that the NH condition prevents subjects from learning to play the Pareto dominant 
equilibrium. Alternatively, if most subjects immediately play the Pareto dominant equilibrium 
in the NC condition after they coordinated on the Pareto inferior equilibrium in the NH 
condition, we could conclude that they have been locked in the inferior equilibrium although 
they were individually able to pierce the veil of money in the NH. Thus, our design could also 
be a useful tool in further studies of the relevance and the nature of money illusion.  
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Appendix A 
 
Appendix A: Instructions 
[The original instructions were in German. The instructions below refer to the nominal 
treatment with human players (NH). The subjects received the instruction below and the 
nominal payoff matrix.] 
Welcome to the experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. You can earn money in 
this experiment. During the experiment, we calculate your income in points. All points you 
earn during the experiment will be converted into Swiss Francs according to the exchange 
rate: 10 points = 0.40 Francs. 
Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment. Please ask us if 
you have questions.  
This experiment has 30 periods. All participants are members of a group. Your monitor 
indicates the number of people in your group. You do not know who is in your group but the 
composition of the group remains stable throughout the experiment. Only the decisions in 
your group are relevant for your earnings. Decisions by other groups are irrelevant for you. 
All group members are in the role of firms. In each period, all firms must simultaneously set 
a price from 1 to 30 (1 and 30 included). How much a firm earns depends on the price it 
chooses and on the average price all other firms in the group choose. 
The income table shows your nominal point income. All firms have the same tables. 
Example: Suppose you choose a price of 15 and the other firms choose prices of 16 on 
average. In this case your nominal point income is 48 points.  
For the determination of your earnings at the end of the experiment, only the real point 
income is relevant. This holds for all firms. To calculate your real point income from your 
nominal point income, you have to divide the nominal point income by the average price of 
other firms. Therefore, the nominal and the real point income are related as follows: 
Real point income = Nominal point income / Average price of other firms 
In the example above, your nominal point income is 48 points, but you real point income is 3 
points (= 48 points / 16). 
Here is how the experiment proceeds: At the beginning of each period, you choose a selling 
price (a number from 1 to 30) and indicate which average price of other firms you expect. At 
the end of each period you are informed about the actual average price of the other firms and 
about your actual real point income.  
Do you have any questions? 
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The decisions of other firms 
[This decision sheet was only given to subjects in the NC and the RC] In this experiment, the 
decisions of other firms will not be taken by other participants but by pre-programmed 
computers. These computers choose their prices depending on your choice. The table 
below shows how the computers respond to your pricing decision.  
 
Your price choice Average price of other 
(computerized) firms 
1 4 
2 4 
3 4 
4 4 
5 4 
6 4 
7 4 
8 5 
9 6 
10 10 
11 14 
12 15 
13 16 
14 17 
15 18 
16 19 
17 20 
18 21 
19 22 
20 23 
21 24 
22 25 
23 26 
24 27 
25 27 
26 27 
27 27 
28 27 
29 27 
30 27 
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Table A1: Payoff table in the nominal treatments (NH and NC)  
Average price of other firms 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
selling price                             
1 13 11 11 15 19 15 13 12 11 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
2 24 25 19 25 32 22 16 14 12 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
3 13 48 44 58 73 37 23 16 13 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
4 6 25 84 112 140 84 39 22 15 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
5 3 11 44 58 73 162 88 37 19 12 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
6 2 7 19 25 32 84 168 80 29 12 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
7 2 5 11 15 19 37 88 152 59 14 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
8 2 4 8 10 13 22 39 80 108 18 14 15 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 25 26 27 28 30 31 32 
9 1 3 6 8 10 15 23 37 59 30 17 16 17 17 18 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
10 1 3 5 7 9 12 16 22 29 50 22 19 18 18 19 19 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
11 1 3 5 6 8 10 13 16 19 30 39 26 22 21 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
12 1 3 4 6 7 9 11 14 15 18 66 48 31 25 23 22 22 22 23 23 24 25 26 27 27 28 29 30 31 32 
13 1 2 4 5 7 8 10 12 13 14 39 84 59 36 29 25 24 24 24 24 25 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
14 1 2 4 5 6 8 9 11 12 12 22 48 104 70 42 32 28 26 26 26 26 26 27 28 28 29 30 31 32 33 
15 1 2 4 5 6 8 9 10 11 12 17 26 59 126 83 48 36 31 29 28 27 27 28 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
16 1 2 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 11 14 19 31 70 150 96 54 40 34 31 30 29 29 29 30 30 31 33 33 34 
17 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 16 22 36 83 176 111 61 44 36 33 32 31 31 31 31 32 34 34 35 
18 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 15 18 25 42 96 204 126 68 48 40 36 34 33 32 32 34 35 35 36 
19 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 10 12 14 17 21 29 48 111 234 143 76 53 43 38 36 35 34 35 37 37 37 
20 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 10 12 13 15 18 23 32 54 126 266 160 84 57 46 41 38 36 38 39 39 38 
21 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 10 12 13 15 17 20 25 36 61 143 300 179 92 62 49 43 40 42 43 42 41 
22 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 10 12 13 14 16 19 22 28 40 68 160 336 198 101 67 53 46 48 50 46 44 
23 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 9 10 11 13 14 16 18 20 24 31 44 76 179 374 219 110 73 57 59 61 54 49 
24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 15 17 19 22 26 34 48 84 198 414 240 120 78 81 84 67 57 
25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 17 18 21 24 29 36 53 92 219 456 263 130 135 140 93 71 
26 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 18 20 22 26 31 40 57 101 240 500 286 297 308 157 99 
27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 18 19 21 24 28 33 43 62 110 263 546 567 588 348 168 
28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 17 19 21 23 26 30 36 46 67 120 286 297 308 667 375 
29 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 17 19 20 22 24 27 32 38 49 73 130 135 140 348 720 
30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 20 21 23 26 29 34 41 53 78 81 84 157 375 
Appendix A 
 
Table A2: Payoff table in the real treatments (RH and RC) 
Average price of other firms 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
selling price                             
1 13 6 4 4 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 24 13 6 6 6 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 13 24 15 15 15 6 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 6 13 28 28 28 14 6 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5 3 6 15 15 15 27 13 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
6 2 4 6 6 6 14 24 10 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7 2 3 4 4 4 6 13 19 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
8 2 2 3 3 3 4 6 10 12 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
9 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 7 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
11 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
12 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 6 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 4 7 5 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 8 5 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 9 6 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
16 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 10 6 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 6 11 7 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 6 12 7 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 7 13 8 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 7 14 8 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 8 15 9 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
22 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 8 16 9 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 
23 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 9 17 10 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 
24 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 9 18 10 5 3 3 3 2 2 
25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 10 19 11 5 5 5 3 2 
26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 10 20 11 11 11 5 3 
27 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 5 11 21 21 21 12 6 
28 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 5 11 11 11 23 13 
29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 5 5 5 12 24 
30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 5 13 
  
Appendix B - Functional Specification of Payoffs 
 
The real payoff function for all players i is:  
2*)(1
1
PP
H
ii
i −++=π  
The table below shows the best reply *iP for player i and the parameter H for every feasible 
average price of the other players iP− . Note that kP , k ∈  {A, B, C}, is the price in equilibrium 
A, B, or C, respectively. kπ , k ∈  {A, B, C}, is the real profit in equilibrium A, B, or C, 
respectively. Recall from Table 1 that PA = 4, PB = 10, PC = 27, πA = 28, πB = 5 and πC = 21. 
For example, if iP−  is below PA – 1, player i’s best reply is given by 1+−iP  and H = 5−Aπ . 
The real payoff matrix is based on the payoff function above but all numbers in the matrix are 
rounded to integers.  
 
Table B1: Real payoffs 
If the average price of other 
firms is in the range  
player i’s best reply *iP is 
given by  
and the parameter H is 
given by 
         1−<− Ai PP  1+−iP  5−Aπ  
      11 +≤≤− − AiA PPP  AP  1−Aπ  
      BiA PPP <+ −<1  1−−iP  iP−+α2  
 Bi PP =−  BP  1−Bπ  
          1−<< − CiB PPP  1+−iP  α−4  
     11 +≤≤− − CiC PPP  CP  1−Cπ  
                 1+>− Ci PP  1−−iP  α−3  
  where: iP−−=10α  
 
  
Table 3: Evolution of Prices and Real Payoffs over Time 
 Average Price Average real payoff 
 Human opponents Computerized 
opponents  
Human opponents Computerized 
opponents 
period Real  
(RH) 
Nominal 
(NH) 
Real 
(RC) 
Nominal 
(NC) 
Real  
(RH) 
Nominal 
(NH) 
Real 
(RC) 
Nominal 
(NC) 
1 8.4 20.1 8.3 17.3 8.9 2.9 21.3 13.1 
2 6.6 20.9 7.4 19.0 13.9 5.3 22.3 15.5 
3 5.2 21.9 7.3 18.3 19.5 6.3 21.7 15.3 
4 4.6 22.2 7.7 17.3 22.5 6.0 25.4 18.1 
5 4.1 22.7 8.9 15.5 24.0 6.7 25.5 21.8 
6 4.0 23.1 9.0 14.4 25.1 8.0 23.8 21.4 
7 3.9 23.4 6.0 15.3 26.6 10.6 26.8 22.6 
8 4.1 23.9 6.0 14.4 25.4 10.9 25.5 23.9 
9 4.3 23.9 7.0 11.6 24.7 11.4 27.1 22.1 
10 4.4 24.0 9.7 12.5 24.0 12.3 23.8 23.1 
11 4.0 24.1 6.8 12.4 26.5 11.5 25.4 24.1 
12 4.0 24.0 6.0 12.3 27.1 11.9 26.8 23.1 
13 4.4 24.1 7.2 12.8 24.4 13.6 25.1 23.6 
14 4.9 24.2 7.0 12.5 21.6 13.5 25.7 24.5 
15 3.9 24.1 5.1 13.4 26.9 14.1 26.6 25.1 
16 3.9 24.5 6.8 10.5 26.3 15.4 25.7 24.6 
17 3.9 25.1 6.0 8.6 26.9 15.1 26.4 24.5 
18 4.2 24.9 8.0 9.2 25.4 13.8 26.3 26.4 
19 3.9 25.3 7.3 9.2 26.7 15.2 25.0 25.2 
20 3.9 26.0 6.0 9.3 27.3 16.9 26.8 26.0 
21 4.0 25.1 6.0 9.7 27.1 13.6 26.0 24.7 
22 3.9 26.1 7.0 9.6 27.0 16.0 27.0 23.6 
23 4.0 26.4 6.0 7.9 27.1 16.9 26.7 24.5 
24 4.0 26.6 7.0 8.7 26.8 15.3 27.0 25.4 
25 3.9 27.1 6.0 8.2 27.1 17.2 26.7 24.1 
26 4.0 27.2 6.0 8.0 27.3 19.1 27.4 26.7 
27 3.9 27.1 6.0 8.1 27.5 19.4 27.4 25.9 
28 3.9 26.7 8.0 8.2 27.5 18.0 27.0 26.3 
29 3.9 26.8 6.0 8.3 27.5 18.4 26.8 26.7 
30 3.9 26.4 7.0 8.2 27.5 17.8 27.4 25.9 
  
Table 4: Percentage of subjects choosing the efficient equilibrium  
       Human opponents Computerized opponents 
period Real  
(RH) 
Nominal 
(NH) 
Real 
(RC) 
Nominal 
(NC) 
1 63.5 0.0 (18.2)* 65.2 22.7 
2 59.6 0.0  (9.1) 69.6 22.7 
3 65.4 0.0 (10.4) 65.2 27.3 
4 78.8 0.0 (14.3) 78.3 31.8 
5 80.8 0.0 (14.3) 73.9 45.5 
6 86.5 0.0 (15.6) 69.6 45.5 
7 94.2 0.0 (26.0) 87.0 45.5 
8 92.3 0.0 (28.6) 82.6 54.5 
9 94.2 0.0 (33.8) 87.0 54.5 
10 92.3 0.0 (37.7) 69.6 59.1 
11 92.3 0.0 (42.9) 82.6 63.6 
12 96.2 0.0 (48.1) 87.0 59.1 
13 92.3 0.0 (46.8) 78.3 59.1 
14 92.3 0.0 (50.6) 82.6 63.6 
15 94.2 0.0 (48.1) 87.0 59.1 
16 90.4 0.0 (49.4) 82.6 68.2 
17 94.2 0.0 (57.1) 87.0 72.7 
18 94.2 0.0 (58.4) 82.6 77.3 
19 94.2 0.0 (59.7) 73.9 77.3 
20 96.2 0.0 (67.5) 87.0 77.3 
21 96.2 0.0 (61.0) 91.3 72.7 
22 94.2 0.0 (66.2) 87.0 72.7 
23 96.2 0.0 (70.1) 91.3 81.8 
24 94.2 0.0 (68.8) 87.0 72.7 
25 96.2 0.0 (71.4) 91.3 81.8 
26 96.2 0.0 (85.7) 91.3 81.8 
27 98.1 0.0 (89.6) 91.3 81.8 
28 98.1 0.0 (85.7) 82.6 81.8 
29 98.1 0.0 (83.1) 91.3 81.8 
30 98.1 0.0 (84.4) 82.6 81.8 
* Numbers in parentheses denote the percentage of subjects playing the inefficient 
equilibrium C.  
  
Table 5: Statistical significance of treatment differences  
period RC vs. NC RC vs. RH NC vs. NH 
1 0.013 0.077 0.609 
2 0.001 0.018 0.401 
3 0.005 0.491 0.951 
4 0.009 0.123 0.950 
5 0.061 0.154 0.531 
6 0.104 0.248 0.192 
7 0.003 0.145 0.603 
8 0.018 0.641 0.295 
9 0.110 0.771 0.005 
10 0.363 0.038 0.019 
11 0.031 0.978 0.033 
12 0.014 0.754 0.006 
13 0.161 0.095 0.015 
14 0.114 0.348 0.006 
15 0.019 0.028 0.015 
16 0.221 0.042 0.002 
17 0.101 0.117 0.000 
18 0.601 0.244 0.000 
19 0.629 0.285 0.000 
20 0.339 0.084 0.000 
21 0.125 0.490 0.001 
22 0.313 0.028 0.000 
23 0.420 0.490 0.000 
24 0.290 0.346 0.000 
25 0.355 0.032 0.000 
26 0.376 0.490 0.000 
27 0.408 0.107 0.000 
28 0.945 0.063 0.000 
29 0.336 0.107 0.000 
30 0.838 0.064 0.000 
Table 5 reports two-tailed p-values of Mann Whitney tests of the null 
hypothesis that average prices are equal across the corresponding 
treatments. Average group prices are the independent units of 
observation.  
  
Figure 1: Average prices and expectations in the treatments with human opponents 
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Figure 2: Average prices across all treatments 
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